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Abstract
The literature so far has analyzed the eﬀects of Minimum Quality Standards
in oligopoly, using models of pure vertical diﬀerentiation, with only two
firms, and perfect information. We analyze products that are diﬀerentiated
horizontally and vertically, with imperfect consumers information, and more
than two firms. We show that a MQS changes the consumers’ perception of
produced qualities. This increases the firms’ returns from quality enhancing
investments, notwithstanding contrary strategic eﬀects. As a consequence,
MQS policies may be desirable as both, firms and consumers, can gain. This
contrasts with previous results in the literature and provides a justification
for the use of MQS to improve social welfare.
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1 Introduction1
The quality of goods is at the center of much policy debate. In Europe, qual-
ity certification and quality standards have become a matter of increasing
concern for firms over the years, along with the completion of the common
market and the implementation of uniform trading rules. In many indus-
tries, ranging from passenger transport, to food, or children toys, quality and
safety regulation are also intertwined and almost indistinguishable. Also, it
is often claimed that consumers have to choose what to buy under less than
full knowledge of the quality of goods; and in many cases qualities are dif-
ficult to ascertain even by experts equipped with the necessary tools. The
present paper deals with mandatory Minimum Quality Standards (MQS)
and studies their eﬀects on product qualities and on welfare in an oligopolis-
tic industry where buyers have less than full information about the quality
of goods. Unlike the present paper, the existing theory of MQS is largely
and almost uniquely based upon models of oligopolistic competition with
pure vertical product diﬀerentiation. These models, derived from the semi-
nal paper by Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979), share some well-known typical
features. First, the firms’ products diﬀer only in one respect, the verti-
cal quality dimension, which is observable and which, if increased, leads to
higher utility for each consumer. Second, in a duopoly, the rival firms try
to diﬀerentiate their products, in order to relax price competition (Shaked
and Sutton (1981). This implies that one of the two producers assigns to its
product a low level of quality, even if it costs nothing to increase it. Third,
once a MQS is introduced at a level that lies between the low and the high
unregulated quality levels (Ronnen 1991), the equilibrium price of goods and
the equilibrium profits of firms decrease. Indeed, since the standard reduces
the distance between the quality levels of the two firms, more intense price
competition brings forth lower prices. This, by the way, also explains why
aggregate profits fall. In this vein of the literature, other papers (Crampes
and Hollander 1995, Scarpa 1998, Valletti 2000, Jinji and Toshimitsu 2002),
explore the issues of consumers’ and firms’ gains and losses, and of quality
changes, always based on models of pure vertical diﬀerentiation.
Another noteworthy common trait of the literature on MQS is that per-
fect information is generally assumed. This is at odds with the very begin-
ning of explanations of MQS-like practices (Leland (1979), where, absent
strategic interplays between producers, these are interpreted as corrections
1We wish to thank participants at the ASSET meeting 2004 in Barcelona for helpful
comments. The first author thanks the University of Crete for its hospitality during some
phases of this research project, started under Marie Curie fellowship MCFI-2002-00153.
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to a ”lemon” phenomenon. In a way, a MQS in Leland (1979) has the ef-
fect of cutting away the lowest tail of a distribution of qualities, thereby
increasing the average marketed quality in a competitive setting. Roughly
speaking, the present paper is in the spirit of this interpretation of MQS,
although the eﬀects on consumers’ expected quality here has a feedback on
the firms’ behavior in a strategic setting.
As to the results obtained in the literature on MQS in duopoly and under
perfect information, some remarks are in order. The predicted decrease in
firms’ profits may be consistent with some real world cases, but it appears
to contrast with other cases in which firms, or association of producers,
voluntarily agree to impose Minimum Quality Standards or, in a similar
way, quality certification standards. Documented instances can be found,
e.g., in agriculture (for instance, Ferguson and Carman (1999) report how
the California kiwifruit producers agreement to a standard allowed them to
withstand competition from New Zealand). Furthermore, the assumption
that consumers are perfectly informed prevents the applicability of results
on consumer welfare to situations where MQS should be introduced because
of concerns about imperfect consumers’ information.
As to the diﬀerentiation feature, it has already been noted (Garella
2003),2 that in a model with perfect information the eﬀects of MQS on
quality levels, are ambiguous if goods are diﬀerentiated also horizontally,
as in the Hotelling (1929) linear city. The average quality in the market is
found to be possibly decreasing because quality competition between firms is
characterized by downward sloping reaction functions, so that in a duopoly
a forced increase in quality due to the MQS by the low quality firm leads to
a lowered quality by the high quality firm. This feature of reaction function
is preserved in the model presented below, although the horizontal quality
diﬀerentiation is represented here according to the so-called ”Dixit-Spence”
(or ”Bowley”) model and not according to a spatial model (Spence 1976,
Dixit 1979, Bowley 1924).
The model we use is also characterized by imperfect information. Each
consumer is assumed to receive some evidence about the utility that he
shall derive by consuming the good. This piece of information can be al-
ternatively interpreted as relating to the goods’ true quality level, which
may diﬀer by what is written on the product ”label”, or as relating to the
carefulness with which the good is manufactured, which may lead to failures
of the good or of some of its components. This piece of information is in
2Perverse quality reactions to the standard had also been found by Scarpa (1995) under
pure vertical diﬀerentiation.
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eﬀect amenable to an idiosyncratic disturbance on the quality observation
of the single consumer. The consumer’s willingness to buy is aﬀected by this
piece of information received, and we exclude from the analysis any sort of
signaling or certification activity by firms that may cancel the eﬀect of this
information.
Firms choose quality levels at the first stage of a game and at the second
and final stage they choose prices. Qualities are costly, so that higher quality
implies higher production costs.
The results that we obtain may help explain why MQS policies are used.
In a model where firms are symmetric, the equilibrium qualities always im-
prove. This is an important result. Indeed, in spite of the firms’ reaction
functions in quality being downward sloping, so that strategic eﬀects on
quality are negative, the eﬀect of a MQS is that of reducing consumers’ un-
certainty about the quality of the two goods. This positive countervail eﬀect
leads to an increased willingness to pay for quality by consumers and to an
increased eﬀort in producing good quality by the firms. We also find that
firms’ profits increase, a result that would explain the use of quality certifica-
tion by (far-sighted) producers’ associations and the producers’ willingness
to accept MQS policies.
The eﬀects on consumers’ welfare are the most diﬃcult to assess. Con-
sumers that receive a correct information about goods coexist in the model
with consumers that receive information that the goods are of lower quality
than it is true. This second type of consumer is more willing to pay for the
goods when MQS are introduced, because the range of quality uncertainty is
reduced. However, this implies that firms are confronted with higher average
demand and therefore will increase their equilibrium prices. This price eﬀect
hurts the perfectly informed consumers. Consumer’s expected surplus can
be increased, unless the signals that consumers receive about qualities are
good with very large probability. Furthermore, too strong strategic eﬀects
in the quality game (namely high substitutability between the goods) also
reduce the positive eﬀects on consumers’ welfare.
Our model has the advantage of allowing an analysis for a number of
firms larger than two. The signs of the impact on qualities, profits, and
welfare of MQS are confirmed for the case with n firms. The unregulated
quality level decreases with the number of firms, but the quality improve-
ment obtained by a MQS increases, as the negative weight of the strategic
eﬀects seem to fade away with an increase in the number of competitors.
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2 The Model
In a market for diﬀerentiated goods, two firms compete by choosing the
quality level of their products and their prices. These choices are modelled
as a two stage game where at each stage moves are simultaneous.
The population of consumers is composed by individuals with identical
tastes, summarized by the (gross) utility function
U(x1, x2) = (α+ s1)x1 + (α+ s2)x2 − (x21 + x22 + 2γx1x2)/2 +m (1)
where xi represents the quantity of good i bought by the representative
consumer, for i = 1, 2, and m is the respective quantity of the “composite
good”. Further, si represents a quality parameter for good i, while the
parameter γ is related to the degree of substitutability between the two
goods and is restricted to lie in the interval [0, 1]. When γ = 0 the goods are
independent and when γ = 1 they are perfect substitutes. Further, p1 and p2
denote the unit prices for the respective goods and the price of the composite
good is normalized as to be equal to 1. The vector p is p = (p1, p2).
Under perfect information, maximization of utility with respect to x1
and x2 gives the (inverse) demand functions for the representative consumer,
pi = (a+ si)− xi − γxj, for i, j = 1, 2, and inverting we obtain the demand
functions,
xi(p, si, sj) =
α(1− γ) + (si − γsj)− pi + γpj
1− γ2 , for j 6= i.
For the sake of simplicity we normalize henceforth the mass of consumers
to N = 1.
Under imperfect information, each consumer receives a private signal
about the quality of the good (as after imperfect inspection). The con-
sumer’s signal about good i is denoted σi. Consumers in proportion µ
receive a correct signal about good i, σi = si. While consumers in propor-
tion 1− µ receive the wrong signal σi = s0 < si. Messages are independent
draws. Therefore the expected proportion of consumers that receive the cor-
rect information about the two qualities is µ2, while (1− µ)2 are expected to
receive a wrong information about both goods, and 2µ(1− µ) are expected
to receive a wrong information about at least one of the two goods. This set
up is a simplified, and therefore more manageable, account of what could
be a more general environment3.
3For instance, true quality of each good results from (i) producer’s investment in quality,
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Demand for good 1 by N = 1 ex-ante identical consumers is:
q1 = µ
2x1(p, s1, s2) + µ (1− µ)x1(p, s1, s0) +
(1− µ)µx1(p, s0, s2) + (1− µ)2x1(p, s0, s0). (2)
A similar expression holds for good 2. From the notation it should be
clear that, for instance, x1(p1, p2, s1, s0) =
α(1− γ) + (s1 − γs0)− p1 + γp2
1− γ2 .
Therefore, after some manipulation, the (expected) demand function under
imperfect information, qi, is given by:
qi(pi, pj, si, sj , s0, µ) =
(1− γ)[α+ s0(1− µ)] + µ(si − γsj)− pi + γpj
1− γ2 .
(3)
In order to simplify notation, let w = (1 − γ)[α + s0(1 − µ)], while
zi = µ(si − γsj) +w, for i 6= j. Then, substituting into (3), we obtain:
qi =
zi − pi + γpj
1− γ2 , for i, j = 1, 2 and j 6= i. (4)
This is a linear demand function, that depends upon the qualities, s1
and s2, upon the information precision, µ and s0, and upon prices.
We assume that each one of the two firms produces only one of the two
products; further, that its cost of producing quantity qi of good i is given
by:
Ci(qi, si) = cqi + s
2
i (5)
As it can be seen we maintain the hypothesis that variable costs are in-
dependent of quality, while fixed costs are increasing, at an increasing rate,
in quality. To simplify the exposition we assume the quality-independent
marginal cost to be c = 0. Then in the last stage, i.e. in the price competi-
tion stage, firm i solves the maximization program
max
pi
πi = pi
µ
zi − pi + γpj
1− γ2
¶
− s2i (6)
determining its average quality, s, and (ii) a disturbance, ε, generated by a random process.
Firms could observe but not credibly reveal ε. Consumers would know its distribution.
Through ”inspection” some consumers would get to perfectly know ε. Some other would
only learn that ε is in some range (e.g. below a threshold level).
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where s1 and s2 are given as first stage choices. The best reply function for
firm i as a function of the rival’s price pj is pi(pj) = zi2 +
γ
2pj .Therefore, by
solving the system of first order conditions, we obtain the Nash equilibrium
prices, in terms of the original parameters,
p∗i =
(2 + γ)(1− γ)[α+ s0(1− µ)] + µ[si(2− γ2)− γsj]
4− γ2 (7)
And symmetrically for firm 2, by interchanging subscripts.
Obviously, p∗1 = p
∗
2 holds only if s1 = s2. Note that the equilibrium prices
are increasing in s0, the value of the lower signal for the wrongly informed
consumers. The same is true for the equilibrium quantities that, from the
first order conditions, are given by q∗i = p
∗
i /(1−γ2). Moreover, the program
for firm i at the first stage, is given by:
max
si
π∗i =
1
1− γ2
∙
(2 + γ)(1− γ)[α+ s0(1− µ)] + µ[si(2− γ2)− γsj ]
(4− γ2)
¸2
− s2i .
(8)
This program admits a maximum for all γ < 0.9325. 4 The best reply
functions in qualities are downward sloping when the second order conditions
are satisfied. This can be easily checked as, from the first order condition
we get the best reply function for firm i as
si(sj) = µ(2− γ2)
(2 + γ)(1− γ)[α+ s0(1− µ)]− µγsj
(4− γ2)2(1− γ2)− µ2(2− γ2)2 , (9)
where the denominator is negative if the second order condition is satisfied.
Therefore, qualities are strategic substitutes.
Exploiting symmetry, the Nash equilibrium qualities turn out to be:
si = s
∗ =
µ(2− γ2)[α+ s0(1− µ)]
(2− γ)2(1 + γ)(2 + γ)− µ2(2− γ2) , i = 1, 2. (10)
Note that for s0 < s∗ to hold, the following condition should be satisfied:
s0
a
<
µ(2− γ2)
(2− γ)2(1 + γ)(2 + γ)− µ(2− γ2) , (11)
4While for each γ ≥ 0.9325, µ should be smaller than µc(γ) ≡ (4− γ2)
p
(1− γ2)/(2−
γ2), with dµc/dγ < 0 and µc(1) = 0.
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i.e. the quality perceived by the uninformed consumers should be suﬃciently
low. In the sequel, we shall assume that (11) holds.
We can then state the following results.
Lemma 1. The equilibrium quality level in an unregulated duopoly is de-
creasing in γ and is therefore highest when the goods are independent.
Proposition 1. The introduction of a MQS, denoted Q, such that s0 < Q,
leads to an increase in the equilibrium quality level.
Note that the increase in quality is obtained also for values of the stan-
dard that lie below the unregulated quality level s∗. Indeed, this is the
situation that one may have in mind. What about the eﬀect of γ on the
eﬀectiveness of a MQS policy? From (10), we get,
Lemma 2. The MQS eﬀectiveness on quality is decreasing in the degree of
substitutability between the two products.
Indeed, one has that d
2s
ds0dγ
< 05. The policy instrument is most eﬀective
for independent goods, where there are no strategic eﬀects. This confirms
that strategic eﬀects decrease the marginal rentability of investments in
quality while direct eﬀects tend to increase it.
3 Welfare Analysis
The welfare analysis of the eﬀects of MQS depend upon the eﬀects on quality,
price, quantity. We can start from the following result:
Proposition 2. Equilibrium price, quantities, and profits are increased if a
standard, Q such that s0 < Q < s∗, is introduced.
Note however that from (7) and (10) one obtains that the hedonic price,
namely the price-quality ratio, is given by,
p∗
s∗
=
(4− γ2)(1− γ2)
(2− γ2)µ (12)
Thus, the hedonic price does not depend on s0 and is inversely related to µ
and γ.
The firms’ equilibrium profits always increase due to the introduction of
the standard. Consumers that are receiving σ = s0, bad information, about
one or both products revise their expectations if a standard prevails. Their
5The cross second derivative is d
2s
ds0dγ =
µ(1−µ)
g(.)2
(2γ5 − γ4 − 8γ3 + 2γ2 + 8γ − 8), which
is negative.
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willingness to pay is increased with respect to the no-standard case, and
their demand for both goods shifts up.
The expected utility of consumers varies according to their expectation of
qualities. We distinguish an ex-ante and an interim stage. At the first stage
one can define the expected utility of a consumer that does not know which
signals he shall receive. The second is the stage at which each consumers
has received the individual signals σ1 and σ2. At the interim stage, the four
groups of consumers obtain diﬀerent (interim) expected utility. Obviously, a
consumer does not know to which group he will be assigned and therefore ex-
ante, or expected, utility is the expectation of the interim utilities, weighted
by the appropriate probabilities, (1− µ)2, µ(1− µ), and µ2.
It is easy to show that the interim utility of consumers that get the
wrong information for both goods, and therefore would buy on the quality
perception s0 for both goods, is increased by the standard. The utility of
those consumers that at the interim stage are perfectly informed is increased
by the standard only in a region of the parameters, because of the price
increase eﬀect they pay for enjoying the equilibrium quality increase.
Consumers that receive a wrong signal about both goods, call it ”group
1” have utility function,
U(x1, x2) = (α+ s0) (x1 + x2)− (x21 + x22 + 2γx1x2)/2 +m− p1x1 − p2x2
(13)
Accordingly, the consumers with interim information that both products
are of low quality gain from the introduction of a MQS.
Lemma 3. The interim expected utility of consumers receiving the wrong
signal that both products are of bad quality is increased after the introduction
of a MQS.
Let us now analyze the utility change of consumers that receive the signal
that both goods are of high quality. Group 4: consumers that are perfectly
informed.
U(h) = (α+ s∗ − p1)x1 + (α+ s∗ − p2)x2 − (x21 + x22 + 2γx1x2)/2 +m
(14)
Lemma 4. The interim expected utility of consumers receiving the true sig-
nal about products is decreased after the introduction of a MQS, except if the
two inequalities, γ >
q¡
2−
√
2
¢
and µ >
¡
4− γ2
¢ 1− γ2
2− γ2 , hold together.
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Figure 1:
Finally, we have no clear-cut result about those consumers (group 2 and
group 3) who get a signal that only one of the qualities is s0. Notice only
that the relative magnitude of this group decreases monotonically as the
product µ(1− µ) is increased and tends to 0 for µ tending to 1 (or 0).
However, by evaluating the weighted sum of the interim surpluses we
obtain the expected consumer surplus for a consumer. We then get the
following result for total and for consumer welfare.
Proposition 3. (a) Total expected welfare in the industry is increased by
the introduction of a standard over a compact set in the (γ, µ) space with
measure larger than 92% of the region of admissible values of (γ, µ) pairs;
in particular, such that either γ < 0.823 or γ > 0.823 and µ < µw(γ) where
µw(γ) is a decreasing function of γ which takes value 1 at γ = 0.823. (b)
Expected consumer surplus is increased by the introduction of a standard for
a region in the (γ, µ) space larger than 90% of all values of (γ, µ) pairs; in
particular, such that either γ < 0.765 or γ > 0.765 and µ < µc(γ) where
µc(γ) is a decreasing function of γ which takes value 1 at γ = 0.765.
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The proposition is illustrated in Figure 1, where the region denoted R1
represents the region where total consumer surplus is increasing, while the
region formed by the sum of R1 and R2 is the region over which total welfare
in the industry is increasing. As for ex-post utility one has two possibilities
to consider. The first is that a consumer never gets to know the true quality
and remains with the information given at the interim stage. Then the sum
over all consumers of the ex-post utility would be equal to the expected
utility, if the population of consumers is large enough. In that case the
results in proposition 3 would apply.
The second possibility for ex-post utility is that a consumer ex-post gets
to know the quality of the good he consumes. This implies that a consumer
belonging, say, to the group that receives the wrong information about both
products buys a quantity of each good given by x`(p∗,Q,Q) =
(α+Q− p)
1 + γ
,
where Q is the level of the standard. Ex post they get to know the true
quality and re-evaluate their utility according to the quantities they have
bought. We have no clear-cut results over the behavior of consumer surplus
in the parameter space, but we can assert that total welfare in the industry
follows a similar pattern to that of expected total surplus.
4 Extension to more than 2 firms
Let x = x1, · · · , xn, s = s1, · · · , sn and p = p1, · · · , pn be the vectors of the
quantities and prices of the n diﬀerentiated goods produced in the industry.
The utility function of the representative consumer, settingm = 0 to shorten
it, is given by
U(x, s) =
nX
i=1
(a+ si)xi −
(x21 + · · ·x2n + 2γ(x1x2 + · · ·+ xn−1xn))
2
−
nX
i=1
pixi
(15)
namely
U(x, s) =
nX
i=1
(a+ si)xi −
(
Pn
i=1 x
2
i + 2γ
Pn
i=1
Pn
j=1,j 6=i xixj)
2
−
nX
i=1
pixi
(16)
As a result, under perfect information the inverse demand function for
firm i is
pi = (a+ si)− xi − γx−i, where x−i =
X
j 6=i
xj (17)
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Then the demand function for firm i is given by
xi =
a(1− γ) + (1 + γ(n− 2)) (si − pi) + γ(pj − sj)
(1− γ) (1 + γ(n− 1)) ,
where p−i =
P
j 6=i pj and s−i =
P
j 6=i sj .
Under uncertainty, i.e. when the probability of observing the true quality
si is µ (with 1 − µ the probability of believing that the quality is s0), and
the quality signals being independent draws, the demand function of firm i
(after manipulations) turns out to be surprisingly simple. Letting [a+ (1−
µ)s0](1− γ) = V it is given by:
qi(p, s, n) =
V + (1 + γ(n− 2)) (µsi − pi) + γ(p−i − µs−i)
(1− γ) (1 + γ(n− 1)) . (18)
Accordingly, the profit function can be written as πn = pqi(p, s, n), and
standard calculations show that the best price reply function is pi(n) =
V + γp−i + µsi(1 + γn− 2γ)− µγs−i
2(1 + γn− 2γ) and the Nash equilibrium prices can
be calculated as,
p∗n =
V + µsi(1 + γn− 2γ)− µγs−i
2 + γn− 4γ . (19)
One can show that the eﬀect of a MQS on equilibrium quality is positive,
by simply looking at the eﬀects on the marginal benefit of an investment in
quality, as follows. Let the equilibrium demand beD∗n, then
6 the equilibrium
profits are
πn = p
∗
nD
∗
n − s2i . (20)
This can be summarized as:
Proposition 4. In an oligopoly with n > 2 firms, equilibrium quality and
equilibrium profits are increased if a MQS higher than s0 is introduced.
The analysis for consumers’ welfare is more complex than for the case
with two firms, but analogous results are obtained. As for profits, since
quality is higher, price shall be higher at a symmetric solution. However,
the quality investment will require additional resources and increase cost.
6D∗n =
V − (1 + γ(n− 2)) p+ γnp+ µ ((1 + γ(n− 2)) si − γs2)
(1− γ) (1 + γ(n− 1)) .
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However, the eﬀect on consumers’ expectations about quality is the same as
for the case with two firms: consumers’ willingness to pay is increased for
each true quality level. This is equivalent to an outward shift in demand
function for each firm, and cannot be detrimental to profits.
The eﬀect of raising n on the equilibrium outcome is an interesting ques-
tion. The following proposition states the main results
Proposition 5.Unregulated quality is decreasing in n, while the eﬀectiveness
of a MQS policy is increasing with n.
This conclusion again depends upon the property that the intensity of
the strategic eﬀects fades away as the number of competitors increases.
5 Conclusions
We have reconsidered the eﬀects of Minimum Quality Standards policies in
oligopoly, introducing imperfect information, and brand diﬀerentiation. The
analysis above has shown that both, firms and consumers, may gain from
the introduction of mandatory quality standards. This is a novel result. The
key to the result is in the updating by consumers of their expectations about
the true quality of the good when a MQS is introduced. This updating may
be obtained, more generally, in models where the information acquisition
process is less specific. For instance, one may assume that consumers observe
a stochastic signal that is centered around the true quality. The MQS would
be eﬀective then as far as it cuts from below the support of the distribution
of the signal.
This shows that the policy implications and the rationale for the ob-
served use of MQS and of mandatory certification policies markedly diﬀer
in the two cases of perfect and imperfect information, because in the first
case the firms reaction to the standard does not depend upon the change in
consumers’ expectations. Since in the real world quality concerns are strong
also where consumers have imperfect information and where they have dif-
ficulties in assessing the way in which goods are manufactured, our analysis
seems justified.
12
REFERENCES
Bowley A.L., 1924, The Mathematical Groundwork of Economics, Oxford
University Press, Oxford.
Crampes, C. and Hollander A., 1995, Duopoly and quality standards, Eu-
ropean Economic Review 39, 71-82.
Dixit A., 1979. A model of duopoly suggesting a theory of entry barriers,
Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 20-32.
Ecchia G. and L. Lambertini, 1997. Minimum Quality Standards and Col-
lusion, Journal of Industrial Economics 44, 101-
Ferguson, C. and H. Carman, 1999, Kiwifruit and the ”Lemon” problem:
do Minimum Quality Standards work?, Agribusiness Forum Papers,
www.ifanna.org/ conferences/9/1999_forum_papers.htm
Gabszewicz-Jaskold J. and J.-F. Thisse, 1979. Price competition, qualities
and income disparities, Journal of Economic Theory 20, 340-359.
Garella P.G. 2003, The Eﬀects of minimum quality standards: better or
worse products? WP 484 Department of Economics (www.dse.unibo.it/
ricerca) September 2003
Hotelling, H. 1929, Stability in competition, Economic Journal 39, 41-57.
Jinji N. and T. Toshimitsu 2002, Minimum Quality Standards under asym-
metric duopoly with endogenous quality ordering: A note, Journal of
Regulatory Economics, 26, 189-199.
Leland, H.E. 1979. Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A theory of Minimum
Quality Standards, Journal of Political Economy 87, 1328-1346.
Lutz, S.; Lyon T.and J.W.Maxwell 2000. Quality leadership when regula-
tory standards are forthcoming, Journal of Industrial Economics, 48,
331-48.
Maxwell, J.W. 1998. Minimum quality standards as a barrier to innovation,
Economics Letters, 58, 355-60.
Ronnen, U. 1991. Minimum quality standards, fixed costs, and competi-
tion, Rand Journal of Economics 22, 490-504.
13
Scarpa, C. 1998. Minimum quality standards with more than two firms,
International Journal of Industrial Organization 16, 665-676.
Shaked A. and J. Sutton 1982, Relaxing price competition through product
diﬀerentiation, Review of Economic Studies 49, 3-14.
Spence A.M. 1976, Product Diﬀerentiation and Welfare, American Eco-
nomic Review , 66, 407-414.
Valletti, T. M. , 2000, Minimum Quality Standards under Cournot compe-
tition, Journal of Regulatory Economics, 18, 235-245.
14
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Letting β0 = α+s0 (1− µ) and taking the derivative of (10), we get ds∗/dγ =
µβ0
g(γ,µ)
¡
2γ5 − γ4 − 8γ3 + 2γ2 + 8γ − 8
¢
where g(γ, µ) = (2 − γ)2(1 + γ)(2 +
γ)−µ2(2− γ2). Therefore, the eﬀect of γ on quality is signed as negative if
the term at the numerator is positive, which is true for all values of γ in the
[0, 1] interval.
Proof of Proposition 1
If Q > s0, consumers who receive the wrong quality signal will update it
to s0 = Q. Notice from (10) that (ds∗/ds0) > 0, so that the eﬀect of an
increase in the standard on equilibrium qualities is positive.
Proof of Proposition 2
Substituting (10) into (7) and simplifying, we obtain
p∗i = p
∗ =
(4− γ2)(1− γ2)[α+ s0(1− µ)]
(2− γ)2(1 + γ)(2 + γ)− µ2(2− γ2) , i = 1, 2 (21)
Moreover, from the first order conditions, we know that q∗i = q
∗ = p
∗
1−γ2 .
It is then clear that dp
∗
ds0
> 0 and dq
∗
ds0
> 0, so that both equilibrium prices
and quantities are increasing in s0 and therefore in the standard. Turning
to profits, by the first order conditions, equilibrium profits are equal to
(p∗)2
1−γ2 − (s
∗)2. Substituting p∗ from (7) and s∗ from (10), we get after some
manipulations:
π∗ =
[(4− γ2)2(1− γ2)− µ2(2− γ2)2][α+ s0(1− µ)]2
[(2− γ)2(1 + γ)(2 + γ)− µ2(2− γ2)]2 , i = 1, 2 (22)
which is positive. Clearly, equilibrium profits are increasing in s0, and thus
increase due to the introduction of the standard.
Proof of proposition 6.
Inverse quality, namely 1s∗ is equal to
((1−γ)(1+γ(n−1))(2+γn−4γ)2)
(((a+(1−µ)s0)(1−γ))(µ(1+γn−2γ)2))
+µ1−γV ,
so that
d(1/s∗)
dn
is positive. Hence ds
∗
dn < 0. Quality as a function of n shows
the following first derivative: ds
∗
dn =
x(n)
V µ(1+γn−2γ)3 , where x(n) is a term that
is independent of s0.We know that ds
∗
dn is negative and therefore
d2s∗
ds0dn
has
the same sign (positive) as d
2s∗
dV dn = −
1
V
¡
ds∗
dn
¢
.
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